{"id":953,"date":"2025-09-16T10:11:06","date_gmt":"2025-09-16T09:11:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/?page_id=953"},"modified":"2025-11-04T10:41:28","modified_gmt":"2025-11-04T10:41:28","slug":"fatalism-and-redemption","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/fatalism-and-redemption\/","title":{"rendered":"Fatalism and Redemption"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n
The Cultural Location of fascism<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

By Malcolm James<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Fascism is thanatological or death-oriented, says Alberto Toscano.1<\/a><\/sup> It is energised by popular appeal to crisis and submits to a common feeling of fatal decline (fatalism), from which a new political order is born. Sometimes mistakenly described as a revolution,2<\/a><\/sup> the emerging order is not actually new, but rather a more assertive zombie3<\/a><\/sup> version of an old order stripped of prior civil, democratic, legal and ethical checks and balances. Across contemporary Europe and North America, we can see narratives of crisis, feelings of decline and projects of rebirth drawing diagonally4<\/a><\/sup> from different ideological wells: liberal and neoliberal (individualism, narcissism and destruction of the social contract); conservative and religious (authority, piety and moralism); nationalist (exclusionary communitarianism5<\/a><\/sup>), and racist and patriarchal (reactionary and hierarchical order). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fatalism is part of fascism\u2019s thanatological condition. At its extremes, it follows discourses of crisis concerning moral breakdown, female liberation, racial threat, trans-rights, the European Union, elites, immigration and, of course, climate science. These discourses give form to a fatalistic sense of decline, from which a project of rebirth can be mapped. Recently, we saw this in the Trump administration\u2019s deportation-as-entertainment-videos, which play into a racialised crisis of social decay from which a white macho capitalist supremacy emerges. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These discourses and projections are increasingly dominant, but they are not uncontested. Liberals, the social justice left and indeed many conservatives do not subscribe to them (or enough of them). They encounter active political resistance. But, at the same time, even those who resist, or do not accord with, these discourses and projections feel their fatalistic pull, not on the same terms as putative fascist sympathisers, but on account of their incremental presence in everyday life. I\u2019m thinking here of the general sense of fatalism occasioned by exploitative working conditions, the erosion of democracy, genocide in Palestine, melting polar icecaps and the creeping militarisation of Europe. These fatalisms are part of an emergent structure of feeling. To understand the organic relationship between fatalism and fascism, the focus on extremes, the far <\/em>right and their spectacles must be complemented by attention to the central and routine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To understand this common sense of fatalism, we need to go beyond its correlation with extreme political and ideological formations. In 2021, IPSOS MORI published a survey on climate change conducted in 27 countries. They found that 20% of young people think it is \u2018too late to fix\u2019 the climate crisis.6<\/a><\/sup> A second survey, reported in the New Scientist,<\/em> found that Gen Z, more than baby boomers, felt that climate collapse was unavoidable.7<\/a><\/sup> A third and fourth survey, published by Focaldata8<\/a><\/sup> and the University of Berkeley Institute for Young Americans, respectively, found that Gen Z respondents in the UK and the US felt that democratic politics were unable to resolve environmental or other dysfunctional social and economic issues.9<\/a><\/sup> Affected by the climate crisis, war, democratic failure, the difficulty of forging a meaningful life in capitalism, and without the conviction of their grandparents that things will get better, younger people often experience the world as unavoidable decline. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his book, The Age of Disruption, <\/em>the philosopher Bernard Stiegler addresses this disposition through the figure of Florian, a young man of 15 who does not see his future in terms of family and career because he believes he will be the last to live. Stiegler does not end his analysis there; Florian\u2019s fatalism is also explained by the social disruption caused by media, information and entertainment systems. These \u2018computational\u2019 technologies have separated Florian from a shared experience of the present and a shared imagination of the future, even with those closest to him.10<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Florian is, admittedly, a somewhat hackneyed European-Enlightenment figure. But he nonetheless allows us to understand how the fatalism reported by young people is related to the computational media and entertainment culture they inhabit. In her recent book, Immediacy,<\/em> Anna Kornbluh elaborates on this, providing insight into how digital media culture is wound up with right-wing dispositions toward the world. She is interested in how intensified bursts of content light up pious social fractures for consumers; the dualistic and stark designations they generate; the blind adherence to flattened confections of inside and outside; the reduction of heterogeneous social relations to flashpoints of ressentiment, narcissism and sadism. As the flash bulb triggers, she says, \u201cThe gray falls away\u2026 everything flickers good or bad, relatable or hateable.\u201d11<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to a survey conducted in the UK by Ofcom in 2024, 93% of Gen Z watch streamed television every week.12<\/a><\/sup> And over the last seven or eight years, which roughly maps onto Trump\u2019s first tenure as US president, there has been a discernible shift toward fatalistic programming. I\u2019m not talking about the BBC\u2019s Blue Planet,<\/em> which juxtaposes 4k natural glamour with climate catastrophe, but the massively popular television series produced by high-grossing US media companies like HBO and Netflix. Succession<\/em> (2018-2023) and The White Lotus<\/em> (2021-2025) are good examples of this, although we could also include Baby Reindeer<\/em> (2024), The Handmaid\u2019s Tale<\/em> (2017-present) and The Last of Us<\/em> (2023-present, also a computer game), as well as films like Triangle of Sadness<\/em> (2022). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fatalism in drama is well established, but in Succession<\/em> and The White Lotus<\/em>, there is little civic or heroic resolution, as we might find in classical tragedy; rather, the narrative perpetuates cycles of dysfunction, lack of agency, social breakdown, decomposition, aggravation, and the futility of escape. In the first series of The White Lotus<\/em>, hotel manager Armond\u2019s self-destruction is the product of belittlement and failed grifting in the context of societal subordination. The actual, and aspiring, patriarchs and matriarchs of Succession<\/em>\u2019s Roy family (Logan, Kendall and Shiv) are irreparably damaged and pathologically cruel. \u2018Ordinary\u2019 middle-class characters, like Paula in season 1 of The White Lotus<\/em> (Olivia\u2019s less privileged, and less white friend), exhibit empathy with the waiting staff but are ultimately required to punch down. The working-class, black and female spa manager, Belinda, is excellent at her job but is continually gamed and exploited by the wealthy clientele. The exception is perhaps Tanya, Jennifer Coolidge\u2019s character in the first and second series of The White Lotus,<\/em> who provides some tragic enlivening. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These series articulate and invigorate different sensibilities too, of course. Both are enjoyed as symbolically clever eat-the-rich offerings \u2013 smart satirical commentary on the deadly sins of the ultra-wealthy.13<\/a><\/sup> But, we should not avoid the fact that what makes these series enjoyable is not principally their semiotic play or the catharsis of watching the elite suffer.14<\/a><\/sup> Rather, fatalism in these dramas is pleasurable because it expunges a shared sense of negation felt by society; a form of ressentiment grounded in the overdeveloped world\u2019s feeling of undeserved decline.15<\/a><\/sup> The fatalism audiences enjoy is explained less by the catharsis of punching up, and more by their painful affinity with lost privilege. It is from there that pleasure in social violence and sociopathy flows. To be sure, these are not deportation videos, but the gratifications found in them are not as dissimilar as we might like to think.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deployment of realism and kitsch, in Succession<\/em> and The White Lotus, <\/em>makes those gratifications all the more seductive. While dystopian and apocalyptic conventions for drama rely on real-world separation (The Handmaid\u2019s Tale <\/em>or The Last of Us<\/em>), the realism of Succession<\/em> makes fatalism intimate. Through a creative non-fiction plot based on the Murdoch family, fly-on-the-wall camera techniques and psychological character insights, Succession<\/em> provides a simulation of reality which is attractive because it feels authentic and alive, and maybe more so than the sterile and unmoored experience of contemporary life. If realism in Succession <\/em>generates a natural and tangible appeal for fatalism, the kitsch aesthetics of The White<\/em> Lotus<\/em> signal its artifice in bourgeois-cum-totalitarian historical form. Incrementally ubiquitous in the mass digital aesthetics of AI-generated visual content, kitsch communicates the unreality of pure capitalism; a sense of lost common feeling in which inorganic energy creates affective connections \u2013 as manifest in the interpersonal and topographic relationships of The White Lotus. <\/em>Immaterial kitsch and pseudo-material realism are then well-suited to fascistic capture, if not the aesthetic register of contemporary fascism itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the end of Slow Violence and the Environmentalism<\/em> of the Poor<\/em>, Rob Nixon16<\/a><\/sup> argues that in an age of environmental and social destruction, media saturation and short attention spans, writers, film-makers and artists should produce culture that makes destruction more obvious. However, the spectacles of destruction, in which we are saturated, have not resulted in the social justice common sense Nixon would have wanted. Seeping into every vestige of popular leftist writing, thinking and reading, they have rather become intertwined with a fateful condition, auspicious of the terrible bind of cultural politics; a \u201cvacuous semblance of the tragic\u201d \u2013 suffering as fate without sublime adversity.17<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How decline is ideologically shaped is an important political and, above all, cultural question. The young people captured in the surveys above are not lacking in images of destruction, but they are struggling to critically address the world as it is, and to find a humanist and planetary plotline within it. To aid them, we might suggest a remedy of optimism \u2013 things will get better \u2013 but that would be palliative, has no critical scope, and would feel conjuncturally illiterate anyway. We might suggest a positive re-framing of the future without negative attention to destruction, but that is inherently compromised \u2013 the warning against undialectical positivity is provided in the 20th<\/sup>-century politics of v\u00f6lkisch<\/em> essence and myth projection. But there remains the option to address the moment through negatively assessing destruction, and from that same location to enliven fragmented alternatives, not as occult rebirth or spectacular symbolic resistance, but as historical and material stories of \u201ctransformation and regeneration\u201d.18<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accounts of fatalism often make recourse to Freud\u2019s analysis of mourning and melancholia. When healthy mourning is blocked, melancholia constitutes a destructive pathology that seeks redress for the object lost. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich developed this approach to understand the inability of Germans to mourn the Holocaust after the end of World War II. Paul Gilroy later explained how British melancholia is accounted for by the loss of former fantasies of greatness occasioned by national, colonial and white decline. The pathology of this fatalism is observable in the English \u201ctwo world wars, one World Cup\u201d chant, and the racist chauvinism that flows from that.19<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But melancholia has other interpretations too. Walter Benjamin\u2019s reverence for melancholy and sorrow was first presented in his failed Habilitationsschrift <\/em>on German Baroque Trauerspiels <\/em>(plays of sorrow),20<\/a><\/sup> and was continued in his writing on Baudelaire, Proust, Kafka, Karl Krauss, Klee and Goethe and in his autobiographical studies on feelings and memories in Berlin. The Trauerspiel, <\/em>while historically specific to the German baroque world, allows for wider reflection on how the melancholic and saturnine, the \u2018world-sadness\u2019 of acedia<\/em> in which the state of grace is renounced, achieves the truest depth and a special and progressive intensification.21<\/a><\/sup> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Under the Sign of Saturn<\/em>,22<\/a><\/sup> <\/em>Susan Sontag elaborates on this by introducing a portrait of Benjamin in thoughtful repose. She explores his veneration for the melancholic type: for apathy, indecision and slowness; dreamy recalcitrance, detachment; an unforgiving reflexivity always in arrears; attendant to memory as discontinuous and prophetic of multiple futures; capable of cheer, especially for the ironic.23<\/a><\/sup> These traits provide a corrective to the immediacy, consumer pleasures and ahistoricity found in capitalist societies but they are not a panacea for collective regeneration. The melancholic is always too solitary for that. Popular and aesthetic forms of melancholia and sorrow, however, overcome those limitations. And in the deadly crucible of COVID-19, a series of post-rave musics started to convey those sentiments. In the hands of Burial and Overmono, redemptive sorrow moved towards restoration, making the world yield to its scrutiny. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Burial first came to attention in 2006 with a self-titled dubstep album. Cultural theorist Mark Fisher heard in it a decaying world haunted with trapped futural energy, in which \u201cmuted air horns flare like the ghosts of raves past\u201d.24<\/a><\/sup> 15 years later, on his pandemic-era track \u2018Dark Gethsemane\u2019, released on the Power of Love<\/em> EP, Burial reworks those spectres through a biblical story. Gethsemane, the garden outside Jerusalem that Jesus visited before he was killed, is re-rendered sonically and narratively to conjure our own capitalist garden, prefigured by destruction. The snippets of gospel that colour the music convey not the coming of the messiah, as might be imagined, but a secular channelling of survival and rebirth through rave and kinetic mutuality. Over three movements (in triptych), the track arrives at a looped preacher\u2019s sample \u201cwe must shock this nation with the power of love\u201d. Offset with garage breaks, moving to happy hardcore instrumentals, where time stretching is not modified in sampling, the absence of regimentation leans both towards the vinyl crackles of the past and the elastic time of the present, as the 808 State \u2018Loon\u2019 sample sounds an atheist\u2019s hymn deep in the hours of the night. That sensual politics of secular anthems is extended in 2024 by Overmono and their remix of the Streets\u2019 \u2018Turn the Page\u2019. In the duo\u2019s hands, the Streets\u2019 archetypal melancholic garage, with Mike Skinner\u2019s first-person vocalisation of post-colonial wreckage and convivial hope,25<\/a><\/sup> comes of time on Britain\u2019s dwindling dancefloors, where (as with Burial) the history of rave is traced and remade in sonic noir<\/em>. Under the tactility of the human voice, deep basslines and pliable tempo, Old Testament transcendence traces patterns for longing and love into this cultural moment.26<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Burial\u2019s \u2018Dark Gethsemane\u2019 ends with a vocal sample inspired by the Songs of Solomon, or Songs of Songs, \u201cwe must discover the power of love, for love it is strong as death.\u201d Sorrowful and redemptive, these popular aesthetic forms inhabit destruction, but not on the fatalist terms of ressentiment and sadism. They lean into the gospel to find the lay language for sorrow and <\/em>love; destruction and<\/em> regeneration, melancholia and<\/em> justice otherwise occluded from the mass aesthetic realm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Previous<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n
Next<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
  1. Alberto Toscano, “Notes on Late Fascism,” (2017). https:\/\/www.historicalmaterialism.org\/blog\/notes-late-fascism. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  2. Enzo Traverso, Revolution: an intellectual history<\/em> (London: Verso, 2021). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  3. See for discussion of Frankenstein\u2019s neoliberalism Wendy Brown, Nihilistic times: thinking with Max Weber<\/em> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2023). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  4. For a well contextualised discussion of William Callison and Quinn Slobodian\u2019s concept see Naomi Klein, Doppelganger: a trip into the mirror world<\/em> (UK: Penguin, 2023). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  5. Decline, melancholia and nationalism are well surveyed. See: Paul Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\/em> (London: Routledge, 2004).; Sivamohan Valluvan, The clamour of nationalism: race and nation in twenty-first-century Britain<\/em> (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  6. https:\/\/www.ipsos.com\/en-uk\/climate-fatalism-grips-young-people-worldwide-while-urgency-solution-oriented-media-grows<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  7. https:\/\/www.newscientist.com\/article\/2290232-younger-generations-are-the-most-fatalistic-about-climate-change\/<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  8. https:\/\/www.kcl.ac.uk\/news\/just-6-of-gen-z-not-over-half-actually-want-a-dictator-study-finds<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  9. https:\/\/www.universityofcalifornia.edu\/news\/young-voters-have-growing-power-broken-politics-leave-them-fatalistic-studies-find ; https:\/\/www.kcl.ac.uk\/news\/just-6-of-gen-z-not-over-half-actually-want-a-dictator-study-finds<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  10. Bernard Stiegler, The age of disruption: technology and madness in computational capitalism<\/em> (Cambridge: Polity, 2020). p.9-10. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  11. Anna Kornbluh, Immediacy or, the style of too late capitalism<\/em> (London: Verso, 2024). p.60. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  12. https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/newsround\/articles\/crg7d130ljpo<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  13. In a University of Sussex seminar, researcher Chris Frantz explored how pride, greed, wrath, envy and lust are addressed in these series. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  14. This is Nietzsche\u2019s original sense of Judaeo-Christian ressentiment for the powerful by the weak. See: Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals<\/em> (UK: Penguin, 2013). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  15. Wendy Brown, In the ruins of neoliberalism: the rise of antidemocratic politics in the west<\/em> (New York: Colombia University Press, 2019). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  16. Rob Nixon, Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor<\/em> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  17. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of enlightenment<\/em> (London: Verso, 1997). p.61-3. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  18. Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black reason<\/em> (Durham and London: Duke, 2017). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  19. Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\/em> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  20. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama<\/em> (London: Verso, 1998). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  21. George Steiner, “Introduction,” in The Origin of German Tragic Drama<\/em>, ed. Walter Benjamin (London: Verso, 1998), 7-24. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  22. Susan Sontag, “Under the sign of saturn,” in Under the sign of saturn<\/em>, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Picador, 1980 [1972]), 109-34. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  23. Sontag, “Under the sign of saturn.”, p.114 \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  24. http:\/\/k-punk.abstractdynamics.org\/archives\/007666.html<\/a> \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  25. For discussion of The Streets see Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\/em> and Ben Burbridge, Post-Rave Britain: history, culture and politics in a world which could be free<\/em> (forthcoming). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  26. Paul Gilroy, The black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness<\/em> (London: Verso, 1993). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n

    <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    By Malcolm James Fascism is thanatological or death-oriented, says Alberto Toscano. It is energised by popular appeal to crisis and submits to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":"[{\"id\":\"da3fbfaa-a9f1-40ff-9103-9df575f440d9\",\"content\":\"Alberto Toscano, \\\"Notes on Late Fascism,\\\" (2017). https:\\\/\\\/www.historicalmaterialism.org\\\/blog\\\/notes-late-fascism.\"},{\"id\":\"36c0604d-eac8-4aca-bd2a-8851a7720395\",\"content\":\"Enzo Traverso, Revolution: an intellectual history<\\\/em> (London: Verso, 2021).\"},{\"id\":\"e103c8dd-aee2-4209-bcef-ea4869a1766a\",\"content\":\"See for discussion of Frankenstein\\u2019s neoliberalism Wendy Brown, Nihilistic times: thinking with Max Weber<\\\/em> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2023).\"},{\"id\":\"0059aaeb-a53d-4dcb-bbd6-5b27dbe9679f\",\"content\":\"For a well contextualised discussion of William Callison and Quinn Slobodian\\u2019s concept see Naomi Klein, Doppelganger: a trip into the mirror world<\\\/em> (UK: Penguin, 2023).\"},{\"id\":\"49d5c8ba-84c1-43e2-abfa-6a006e71ee15\",\"content\":\"Decline, melancholia and nationalism are well surveyed. See: Paul Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\\\/em> (London: Routledge, 2004).; Sivamohan Valluvan, The clamour of nationalism: race and nation in twenty-first-century Britain<\\\/em> (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).\"},{\"id\":\"d49332e5-cc08-4f1b-a5e8-07fc2ecb1b5d\",\"content\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.ipsos.com\\\/en-uk\\\/climate-fatalism-grips-young-people-worldwide-while-urgency-solution-oriented-media-grows<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"8c496727-a7ce-44b4-954d-36bc80ac206b\",\"content\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.newscientist.com\\\/article\\\/2290232-younger-generations-are-the-most-fatalistic-about-climate-change\\\/<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"4da4d4ae-3315-406b-a73f-e85c5842d819\",\"content\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.kcl.ac.uk\\\/news\\\/just-6-of-gen-z-not-over-half-actually-want-a-dictator-study-finds<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"e2925269-0a9c-4b33-82de-eb4a969a1d8d\",\"content\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.universityofcalifornia.edu\\\/news\\\/young-voters-have-growing-power-broken-politics-leave-them-fatalistic-studies-find ; https:\\\/\\\/www.kcl.ac.uk\\\/news\\\/just-6-of-gen-z-not-over-half-actually-want-a-dictator-study-finds<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"f33ca74f-9094-44e4-bff4-19603553708c\",\"content\":\"Bernard Stiegler, The age of disruption: technology and madness in computational capitalism<\\\/em> (Cambridge: Polity, 2020). p.9-10.\"},{\"id\":\"1dcc8e91-6e47-4fd5-8d3e-4c551ff000e6\",\"content\":\"Anna Kornbluh, Immediacy or, the style of too late capitalism<\\\/em> (London: Verso, 2024). p.60.\"},{\"id\":\"076d2d92-a271-4e1c-a7db-77b01848ad55\",\"content\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.bbc.co.uk\\\/newsround\\\/articles\\\/crg7d130ljpo<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"49007327-5769-4607-8192-83f8ea06237f\",\"content\":\"In a University of Sussex seminar, researcher Chris Frantz explored how pride, greed, wrath, envy and lust are addressed in these series.\"},{\"id\":\"66f8db0f-9602-40be-b3ae-eea0594e6297\",\"content\":\"This is Nietzsche\\u2019s original sense of Judaeo-Christian ressentiment for the powerful by the weak. See: Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals<\\\/em> (UK: Penguin, 2013).\"},{\"id\":\"5a57027d-3cd3-48ef-9e83-7709a2be9f78\",\"content\":\"Wendy Brown, In the ruins of neoliberalism: the rise of antidemocratic politics in the west<\\\/em> (New York: Colombia University Press, 2019).\"},{\"id\":\"4237bd0d-988f-4f13-b96b-b3b00da3c31e\",\"content\":\"Rob Nixon, Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor<\\\/em> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).\"},{\"id\":\"38432b75-e0d0-400f-95e1-58992701cb8e\",\"content\":\"Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of enlightenment<\\\/em> (London: Verso, 1997). p.61-3.\"},{\"id\":\"5ce6e7c3-b090-4a99-9990-81d7f7d47018\",\"content\":\"Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black reason<\\\/em> (Durham and London: Duke, 2017).\"},{\"id\":\"93db1254-c567-4227-bdc8-8ed728ec31af\",\"content\":\"Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\\\/em>\"},{\"id\":\"bf6f1c67-762a-4619-a002-657290d053f3\",\"content\":\"Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama<\\\/em> (London: Verso, 1998).\"},{\"id\":\"7b109acc-b2e1-44f5-800c-d63b559ee96f\",\"content\":\"George Steiner, \\\"Introduction,\\\" in The Origin of German Tragic Drama<\\\/em>, ed. Walter Benjamin (London: Verso, 1998), 7-24.\"},{\"id\":\"96b0c493-4509-47a4-85c0-7e272c01d8fe\",\"content\":\"Susan Sontag, \\\"Under the sign of saturn,\\\" in Under the sign of saturn<\\\/em>, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Picador, 1980 [1972]), 109-34.\"},{\"id\":\"4819f4d9-60de-48c1-a72d-007090eace98\",\"content\":\"Sontag, \\\"Under the sign of saturn.\\\", p.114\"},{\"id\":\"f371eb91-6dae-47b4-8f08-c53fe850d55c\",\"content\":\"http:\\\/\\\/k-punk.abstractdynamics.org\\\/archives\\\/007666.html<\\\/a>\"},{\"id\":\"c20f4c56-e45e-4fbc-98df-aa8d25f00bfe\",\"content\":\"For discussion of The Streets see Gilroy, After empire: melancholia or convivial culture?<\\\/em> and Ben Burbridge, Post-Rave Britain: history, culture and politics in a world which could be free<\\\/em> (forthcoming).\"},{\"id\":\"7dae056d-3e3a-4361-b091-ab1a17c5004c\",\"content\":\"Paul Gilroy, The black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness<\\\/em> (London: Verso, 1993).\"}]"},"class_list":["post-953","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/953","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/147"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=953"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/953\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1309,"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/953\/revisions\/1309"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reframe.sussex.ac.uk\/statesofculturalanalysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=953"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}